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引入需求上限的鹰鸽博弈中合作和竞争的演化动态

On Evolution Dynamics of Cooperation and Competition in the Hawk and Dove Game within Upper Limit of Demand
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摘要 重点研究考虑资源最大需求上限的鹰鸽博弈中合作和竞争的演化动态.我们假设参与博弈的鸽策略者对资源的最大需求量为m1,参与博弈的鹰策略者对资源的最大需求量为m2(m1<m2),资源总量为V(0<V<m1+m2),斗争导致受伤的代价为c(c>0).首先求出当2m1<m2时,资源总量V的取值不同时的收益矩阵.随后求出当m2<2m1时,资源总量V的取值不同时的收益矩阵.基于收益矩阵最后研究引入需求上限的鹰鸽博弈中合作和竞争的演化动态. Our focus is on the evolution dynamics of cooperation and competition in the hawk and dove game within the upper limit of resource demand. If the maximum resource demand of the dove strategists is m1 ,meanwhile,that of the hawk strategists is m2 (m1 〈 m2) and the total resource is V(O 〈 V 〈 m1 + m2 ), the cost of fighting wounds will be c ( c 〉 0 ). Firstly, under the condition of 2m1 〈 m2, the total resource V is measured against non-simultaneous income ma- trix; Secondly,under the condition of m2 〈 2m1, the total resource V is measured against non- simultaneous income matrix. Lastly, based on income matrix, evolution dynamics of cooperation and competition in the hawk and dove game within the upper limit of resource demand are stud- ied.
出处 《西安文理学院学报(自然科学版)》 2015年第1期22-26,共5页 Journal of Xi’an University(Natural Science Edition)
关键词 Moran过程 鹰鸽博弈 进化博弈理论 Moran process hawk and dove game evolutionary game theory
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