项目制与粮食生产的外部性治理

The Project System and the Rectification of the Externality of Food Production

国家通过粮食增产项目保证国家粮食安全,项目在运作过程中一方面需要治理主产区粮食生产活动的外部性,另一方面也需要解决农户层面粮食增产的外部性问题。项目制对粮食增产的这样两层外部性进行治理时,涉及到国家和地方政府、地方政府和散户、以及散户与大户的三层博弈。博弈的结果是,中央通过项目制的技术理性加强对地方的监控,约束了地方政府安排粮食生产的自主性,以打造"马路工程"来迎接上级对项目的考核验收;地方政府为了应对上级考核,以行政手段推动耕地流转、牺牲散户、发展大户的方式来降低项目实施的治理成本,进而产生粮食增产项目中大户与分散小农户之间的博弈,博弈的结果是大户粮食生产绩效低下,而需要政府进行全方位的扶持,这进一步推动地方政府的农业项目和政策资源向大户倾斜。

The project of increasing food production is the government's measure of ensuring the food securityof the state. To run such a project,it is required to rectify the externality of food production for the main producing regions on the one hand,and address the externality of increased food production for the farming households on the other. The tackling of these two externalities leads to a three-tier game between the central and the local governments,between the local government and the minor households,and between the minor and the major households. The results are manifold. Through the technological rationality of the project,the central government is able to tighten its grip on the local government,harness the latter's autonomy in the arrangement of food production,and call for new road constructions to welcome inspections from the higher authority. In order to pass inspection,the local government uses administrative means to reduce governance cost by enforcing land transfer to the benefit of the major farming households at the expense of the minor ones. This in turn gives rise to the game between the major and the dispersed minor households,resulting in lower production efficiency of the major households in food production and greater pressure on the local government for comprehensive support.All this obliges the local government to tip the balance of the agricultural projects and policy more in favor of the major households.