摘要
针对OFDMA认知无线电网络,提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈的频谱定价和分配模型。对于次基站控制次网络传输功率来保护主网络通信的场景,主基站可通过该模型获得最优的频谱定价方案。从功率控制的角度,重新设计次用户的效用函数,运用Stackelberg博弈对单个主基站和多个次用户在频谱租赁市场中的交易行为进行建模。通过逆向归纳法,求解市场均衡下的最优频谱定价,使得主基站在考虑主网络QoS降级的同时获得最大收益。此外,对于主基站只能获取本地信息的情形,提出了基于动态Stackelberg博弈的分布式频谱定价和分配模型。仿真实验表明,该模型能够在控制次网络传输功率的基础上,提供最优频谱定价和频谱分配方案。
This paper proposed a Stackelberg game-based model for spectrum pricing and allocation in orthogonal frequency division multiple access(OFDMA)cognitive radio networks.With this model,the primary base station(PBS)can obtain the optimal pricing solution in the scenario where secondary base station(SBS)controls the transmission power of the secondary network to protect the primary network transmission.We redesigned the utility function of secondary user(SU)with the consideration of power control,and formulated the trade behaviors in spectrum leasing market,in which a single PBS acts as a seller and multi-SUs act as buyers,by a Stackelberg game model.Using backward induction,we solved the optimal pricing at market equilibrium with which the PBS can maximize its profit under QoS constraints.Besides,considering that limited information is available locally at the PBS,we presented a distributed dynamic Stackelberg game-based spectrum pricing and allocation model.Simulation results demonstrate that this model can obtain the optimal spectrum pricing and allocation scheme with controlling the secondary network transmission power under the interface threshold of the primary network.
出处
《计算机科学》
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第3期85-90,共6页
Computer Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71272144)
广州市科技计划项目(2013KP084)资助