人力资本形成中的家庭纽带与社会互动

Family Linkages and Social Interactions in Human Capital Formation

本文在经典的贝克尔人力资本模型中引入子女的主动参与行为,考察其与父母投资的互动。均衡分析表明,家庭互动可导致人力资本投资低于即期最优水平,但与专制家长的选择一致,这与贝克尔坏孩子定理的见解类似。在社会互动中,积极的同辈效应导致人力资本的代内传递。考察代际与代内力量的相互影响得到新的洞见:比如,家庭互动可放大同辈效应,并反映在社会乘数的调整上;内生的家庭互动也使得社会互动在实证上更加难以识别。

This paper extends the classic Beckerian model to allow for endogenous par- ent-child interactions in human capital formation. I characterize the equilibrium outcome, which determines the intergenerational transmission of human capital and family wealth. The model is then reconsidered in a group setting in which social interactions may lead to intragem erational transmission of human capital. I explore the implications of the interplay between in- ter and intragenerational forces for human capital dynamics, the rise and fall of families, and the evolution of social inequality.