摘要
选取实体经济的代表且并购事件多发的制造业上市公司为研究样本,依据2010年沪深两市A股上市公司相关并购数据,运用事件研究法,基于BHAR变量考察管理层股权激励对长期并购绩效的影响。实证研究结果表明:股权激励强度与长期并购绩效之间呈"倒U"型关系,并且当管理层持股比例低于8.11%时对长期并购绩效起到积极作用,当管理层持股比例超过8.11%时对长期并购绩效起到反作用。根据研究结论,适当的股权激励有助于提升长期并购绩效,但是制造业上市公司股权激励水平应该控制在合理水平。
The paper selects manufacturing companies which are the representatives of real economy and frequently involved in MA events as the research samples,and based on the relevant data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2010,the impact of management equity incentives on the long-term performance of MA is investigated by employing event study method and BHAR variable. The results show that there is an "inverted U-shape"relationship between equity incentives and long-term performance of MA. Furthermore,when the shareholding ratio of management level is less than 8. 11%,equity incentives play a positive role in the long-term performance MA,and when the ratio exceeds 8. 11%,equity incentives play a negative role in the long-term performance of MA. Therefore,appropriate equity incentive is helpful for the long-term performance of MA,but the equity incentive level of manufacturing industry should be controlled in a reasonable range.
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期127-132,共6页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
湖南省科技厅项目"科技与金融融合促进我省新型工业化发展研究"(2014zk3083)
湖南工业大学研究生创新基金项目"管理层特征
股权激励与并购绩效的实证研究"(CX1418)
关键词
股权激励
长期并购绩效
制造企业
Equity Incentives
Long-term Performance of M&A
Manufacturing Companies