1Bertrand Russell. On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 2, Problems of Science and Philosophy, 1919, p36, p29, p29-30, pl, pl, p28, p39.
2Bertrand Russell.The Analysis of Mind, the Project Gutenberg Etext,London: George Allen and Unwin; New York:The Macmillan Company,1921,p255,p219,p261, p252-252,p271,p274,p261,p261,p297,p300,p301,p262.
7Scott Soames,What is Meaning,Princeton:Prince- ton University Press,2010,p4.
二级参考文献16
1R. J. Bogdan ed. , Belief: Form, Content, and Function, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 1 - 11.
2Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge MA : MIT, 1987, p. 14, p. 101.
3Sudan A. Turner, Intentionality of PA and Intrinsic Semantic Concept, UMI, 2004, pp. 1 - 2.
4Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 198.
5Colin McGinn, Mental Content, New York : Basil Blackwell Inc. , 1989, p. 120, p. 120.
6Steven Boer, Thought-Contents: On the On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution, Springer,2007,p. 5,p. 8.
7Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes : a Practical Approach to the Mind, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995 ,pp. 4 -22.
8Robert Stalnaker, What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?, in York H. Gunther, Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Cambridge, MA : The MITPress ,2003, pp. 94 - 106.
9Anandi Hattiangadi, Oughts and Thoughts : Rule -following and the Normativity of Content, New York : Oxford University Press Inc. ,2007 ,p. 37.
10McDowell,Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 40.