摘要
经典资本结构理论认为债务具有税盾效应和财务杠杆效应,因此公司会选择适当的负债以获得债务的税收收益。但是,现实中一些公司的负债很低,甚至为零。公司为什么放弃债务的税收收益呢？本文以2007~2011年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,从行为公司金融的视角分析管理者能力是否导致公司采用“低杠杆”策略。结果表明,中国上市公司存在普遍的低杠杆现象,管理者能力的差异是导致公司采用“低杠杆”策略的重要原因。
The traditional theories of capital structure argue that there is optimal leverage of firm for liabilities make the firm obtain the tax shield and financial leverage effect. This is benefit to maximize the shareholder value. However, some firms give up the tax shield of debt, choose low lever or zero debt in reality. Using the financial data of China A - share listed companies in the years from 2007 to 2011. This paper proposes a measure of managerial ability, based on managers＇ efficiency, which calculated by data envelopment analysis （DEA）. Then we analyze the relationship between manager ability and the decision of ＂low lever＂ in firm. The results show that the low leverage phenomenon of firms is widespread in Chinese companies. The difference of manager ability is one of the reasons for firm＇ s ＂low leverage＂ puzzle.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期103-107,共5页
On Economic Problems
基金
国家自然科学基金项目（71371113）
教育部人文社会科学青年研究基金项目（12YJC790251）
