退出,呼吁与国际法的演化和发展——基于阿尔伯特·赫希曼的理论视角

Exit,Voice,and the Evolution and Development of International Law ——A Perspective from Albert Hirschman's Theory

长期以来,国家从国际协定和国际组织单边退出的现象为大多数法律学者所忽视。大部分国际法的学术文献倾向于谴责退出法律的行为。但是,在很多情形下,退出国际法是可取的。本文运用阿尔伯特·赫希曼传统上用以衡量公司或政治组织衰败的"退出、呼吁和忠诚"框架,以说明退出国际法的理由在于,事实上从利用退出选项的可能性中获益的国家可在全球化进程中赢得更大的发言权,并可能在不断变化世界中为促进国际法和国际组织的效率和适应性提供一条快捷路径。

The phenomenon of countries unilateral exit from international agreements and international organizations has been overlooked by most legal scholars for long. In most academic literature on international law,there is a tendency to condemn exit from law. However,a variety of circumstances arise under which the exit from international law is desirable.This article employs Albert Hirschman＇s framework of ＂ exit,voice,and loyalty＂,traditionally used to measure the decline of a firm or polity,to illustrate the reason for the exit from international law is that countries those benefit from the availability of actual exit options would gain more voice in the process of globalization and may offer a short route toward facilitating the efficiency and adaptability of international law and international organizations in an ever-changing world.