版权法激励作用的博弈论分析

The Game Theory Analysis of Copyright Incentive Effect

一直以来,由于缺乏合适的客观指标,版权法的激励作用都无法得到确切的衡量与比较。而从作者、社会公众和传播者等版权激励机制参与者入手,分析其在特定制度环境下可能做出的最优策略选择,不失为一种间接判断版权法激励作用的途径。博弈论便是践行这种判断途径的最佳工具,通过建构博弈矩阵,分析作者、社会公众和传播者在不同制度环境下作出的最优策略选择,可以清晰地得出版权制度以及网络环境对于参与者群体策略选择的影响,从而衡量其相应的激励作用。

Due to the lack of suitable objective indicators, copyright incentive effect always cannot be measured and compared exactly. But if we analyze the author, the public and the disseminator＇s optimal policy choices that may be made in specific institutional environment, we can judge the copyright incentive effect indirectly. And the Game Theory is the best tool for this way. We can build up the game matrix to analyze the optimal policy choices of the author, the public and the disseminators in different institutional environment, thereby measuring the incentive effect of copyright law and Intemet environment clearly.