期刊文献+

期货交易所与监管层多主体博弈分析——以交易品种竞争为视角 被引量:2

Analysis of Multi-subject Game between Futures Exchange and Regulators——From the Perspective of Trade Varieties Competitiom
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摘要 期货市场的信息博弈是指监管层、交易所、期货公司和投资者等各参与主体间围绕信息流动各环节产生的信息不对称这一固有现象进行的博弈。信息博弈的关键要素是资源配置。在现有的法律框架下,期货交易所申请新品种上市,需由作为监管层的中国证监会审核和批复。监管层是品种资源的所有者,交易所是品种资源的使用者,监管层的职责就是将有限的品种资源在各交易所间合理分配以实现整个期货行业的收益最大化,而交易所的目标则是争取到足够的品种资源使本交易所的收益最大化,因此,每个交易所与监管层间都不可避免地产生信息博弈。通过构建基于品种竞争的期货交易所与监管层的信息博弈模型,可以进一步解释资源有限条件下一个分配者与多个争取者之间的多主体博弈,具有普遍的分析意义。 Information game in futures market refers to the game of regulators,exchanges,futures company and investors around the inherent phenomenon of the information asymmetry occurred in each link of the information flow.The key element of information game is the allocation of resources.In the existing legal framework,futures exchange listing of new varieties needs the regulators as China SFC's auditing and approval.Regulators are owners of variety resources,exchanges are users of variety resources,the obligation of regulators is allocating limited resources between each exchange reasonably in order to maximize earnings of whole exchange industry,while the object of exchange is striving for enough variety resources in order to maximize earning of its exchange.The game between the exchange and the supervisor is inevitable.Constructing game model of futures exchange and supervisor on the basis of varieties competition can further explain the multi-subject game between a distributor and a plurality of activists with limited resources and it has the universal significance for relevant analysis.
作者 张璇 张玉智
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期18-21,共4页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 吉林省高校社会科学"十二五"规划重点项目(201238)
关键词 期货交易 信息博弈 品种竞争 资源配置 Futures exchange Information game Varieties competition Resources allocation
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