侵占动机、资本结构与业绩表现——兼评产权性质的调节效应

Expropriation Motivation,Capital Structure and Corporate Performance

在新兴资本市场中,终极控股股东实施利益侵占的内在动因、作用路径和影响后果是近年来研究的焦点问题之一。运用代理理论和信息不对称理论,规范分析了终极控股股东侵占动机对资本结构决策的作用机制及其对业绩的影响。通过构建计量模型,以深交所主板制造业2012年701家上市公司为研究对象,实证检验侵占动机对资本结构的影响以及产生的业绩后果。研究结果发现终极控股股东的侵占动机提高了控股子公司的资本结构但降低了公司业绩,并且国有产权性质终极控股股东进一步加剧了业绩下滑。本文丰富了终极控股股东的利益侵占假说,为降低大股东利益侵占与提高投资者保护提供了启示。

In the emerging capital market,the internal agents,functioning approaches and consequences of expropriation implemented by ultimate controlling shareholders are ones of the recently focused issues.Using agency theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper normatively analyses the functioning mechanism of ultimate controlling shareholders expropriation motivation on capital structure decisions and corresponding impact on corporate performance.Selecting 701 samples from Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies on the main board of manufacturing in 2012,this paper constructs an econometric model to empirically examine the influence of expropriation motivation on capital structure and consequent corporate performance.This paper finds that the expropriation motivation of ultimate controlling shareholders improves corporate capital structure of controlling subsidiaries,but lowers corporate performance.The state owned quality of ultimate controlling shareholders further aggravates corporate performance.This paper enriches ultimate controlling shareholders expropriation hypothesis and provides reference for weakening major shareholders expropriation and improving investors＇ protection.