财政分权下地方政府行为与非经济性公共品——基于新制度经济学的视角

Chinese Local Government's Behavior under Fiscal Decentralization and Non-Economic Public Goods Provision——Under the Viewpoint of New Institutional Economics

财政分权下地方政府行为的内涵表现为地方政府竞争和地方政府治理两大特征。分权下的地方政府因其产权的缺失及"经济人"的特性,为了争夺资本,扩大投资规模,竞相展开财政竞争,将公共资源优先配置在能带来更多利益的基础设施等经济建设类投资,从而忽视非经济性公共品及公共服务的投资;而为了顺应财政分权改革及地方发展的需要,地方政府为使交易成本最小化,努力改善政府治理结构,提高政府治理水平,从而起到改善非经济性公共品及公共服务供给的作用。

This paper makes use of the new institutional economics to study the performance of local government behavior under fiscal decentralization,and shows the relationship between non-economic public goods provision and local government behavior. We find that the local government is not interested to provide non-economic public goods under fiscal decentralization. Moreover,we develop a theoretical model to analyze how the local government under fiscal decentralization affects non-economic public goods,and find that fiscal competition between local governments has a negative impact on non-economic public goods provision,while local governance was a positive impact on non-economic public goods provision.