基于博弈论视角的版权保护策略研究

针对市场中存在的盗版问题，本文通过建立博弈模型，分析了政府、正版企业与盗版者的博弈关系和市场均衡情况，以及政府的最优监管政策与正版企业防范盗版的策略选择。研究表明，降低企业防范盗版的成本或法律诉讼的成本，企业会提高自身版权保护的积极性。降低政府监管政策的实施成本，加大对盗版者的侵权赔偿和罚款，可以有效降低市场中的盗版行为，同时政府可以降低稽查力度，减少对市场中盗版行为的抽查比例。政府在实施版权保护政策时，不仅需要考虑政策实施成本，还需要在保护正版企业和社会公共利益之间进行适当平衡。此外，正版企业和政府在反盗版的行为中，存在此消彼长的博弈关系，双方均存在搭便车的可能性。

Aiming at piracy in the market, this paper uses game model to analyze the market equilibriums and the relationships among the government, the legitimate business and the pirate. At the same time, it also studies the government＇s optimal supervision policy and genuine manufacturer＇s strategy choice. The research indicates that the legitimate business will improve the probability to fight against the piracy when the cost of piracy prevention is reduced. To reduce implementation costs, in crease the tort compensations and fines, the government will reduce the piracy and proportion of piracy checks in the market effectively. In implementing copyright protection policies, the government needs to consider not only the cost of policy implementation, but also the balance between the copyright protection and public interests. Besides, in the anti -piracy act, the government and the legitimate business will both be likely to free -fide.