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大股东排名不同对收益率的影响 被引量:3

Impact of Different Positions of Major Shareholders on Rate of Return
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摘要 以日本东京证券交易所上市公司为研究对象,对排名前三位的大股东与公司治理效率之间的关系进行研究。希望通过对具有不同背景的大股东在处于不同排名位置时所表现出的对企业长期收益水平的不同态度,判断不同背景大股东在不同位置时对公司治理效率产生的影响,从而找到一种大股东之间相对较优的均衡关系。研究表明,机构投资者无论处于何种位置都能对第一大股东产生有效制约,而其他大股东不具备上述能力。 Taking listed companies of Tokyo Stock Exchange as research object, the relationship between the top three major shareholders and the efficiency of corporate governance is studied. Through the analysis of the attitudes of the major shareholders with different backgrounds at different positions on long-term benefits of enterprises, the influence of the major shareholders with different backgrounds at different positions on corporate governance efficiency is determined, to find a relatively better balance between major share holders. Studies show that, regardless of what position of institutional investors in, they can effectively control the first major shareholders, and other major shareholders do not have this capabilities.
作者 苏剑 王蔷
出处 《沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)》 2015年第1期23-26,共4页 Journal of Shenyang University:Social Science
基金 辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(W2013262)
关键词 大股东 排名 收益率 major shareholder ranking rate of return
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