期刊文献+

激励性规制:国有企业高管薪酬规制的制度重构 被引量:4

Incentive Regulation:Institutional Reconstruction of Payment Regulation of Top Managers in SOEs
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摘要 我国国有企业高管薪酬规制经历了放权让利、年薪制、股权激励、限薪和降薪等五个规制发展阶段,目前尚存在着规制手段相对较单一、法律程序规制乏力、信息披露规制不足和薪酬制衡规制缺失等问题,需要从激励性规制的角度建立一个激励相容的规制制度,并完善相应的配套制度与机制,包括法律程序规制、信息披露制度、绩效评价制度和薪酬制衡机制等。 The payment regulation of top managers of SOEs(i.e.State Owned Enterprises)has experienced the five stages of development:decentralization and interest concessions,yearly payment system,equity incentive,salary limit,and salary cut.But there are still some problems currently as follows:The regulating approaches are single relatively;the regulation of legal proceedings is absent of power;information disclosure regulation has been unsound,and compensation balance regulation,etc.It is needed to establish a system of incentive compatibility regulation from the perspective of incentive regulation and perfect the corresponding supporting system and mechanism,including the legal proceedings regulation,information disclosure system,the performance evaluation system and payment balance mechanism,etc.
作者 罗昆 马磊
出处 《石家庄铁道大学学报(社会科学版)》 2015年第1期24-29,共6页 Journal of Shijiazhuang Tiedao University(Social Science Edition)
关键词 激励性规制 高管 薪酬 制度重构 国有企业 incentive regulation top manage payment institutional reconstruction SOE(State Owned Enterprises)
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献27

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