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企业扩张、激励不足与管理层在职消费 被引量:16

Firm Expansion,Insufficient Incentives,and Managerial Perquisites
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摘要 管理层获取私人收益的动机是影响企业投资决策行为的重要因素。以我国上市公司高管薪酬制度改革为背景,考察了企业扩张行为对管理层在职消费的影响及其可能引发的后果。研究发现,企业扩张与管理层在职消费显著正相关,并且随着企业扩张程度的增大,管理层在职消费占其总收益的比重提高;进一步地,当管理层货币薪酬低于同行业-规模可比公司管理层薪酬水平中位数时,管理层通过企业扩张获得的在职消费越多,并且负向的同行薪酬差距越大,企业扩张与管理层在职消费的正向关系越显著。研究结果表明,管理层通过企业扩张增加了在职消费,改变了自身的报酬结构,在避免引起公众非议及薪酬管制的同时确保了自身收益的增加及持续增长,而薪酬激励不足引发的不公平感知及攀比心理进一步增强了管理层借企业扩张获取在职消费的动机。 Management's motivation to pursue private benefits is an important factor that affects the corporate investment decision making. Based on the reform of executive compensation system in Chinese listed companies, we study the effect of firm expansion on managerial perquisites and their potential consequences. The results show that firm expansion is significantly positively associated with managerial perquisites, and the proportion of perquisites to total managerial compensation increases with the degree of firm expansion. Furthermore, managerial perquisites obtained from firm expansion are significantly higher when their cash compensation is below the median of industry peers. And the relationship between firm expansion and managerial perquisites is more pronounced with higher negative peer group compensation dispersion. These findings suggest that managers increase their perquisites and change their remuneration structure through firm expansion, thereby avoiding the public criticism and violating compensation regulations to ensure the increase and sustainable growth of their income. Unfair perception and psychological comparisons caused by insufficient incentives further strengthen the management motivation to pursue private benefits through firm expansion.
出处 《会计与经济研究》 北大核心 2015年第1期24-40,共17页 Accounting and Economics Research
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302185) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(14XJA630002) 西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费2015年度培育项目(JBK150926) 西南财经大学博士研究生科研项目(JBK1407087)
关键词 企业扩张 在职消费 激励不足 同行薪酬比较 薪酬差距 firm expansion perquisites insufficient incentives peer pay comparison compensation dispersion
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