基于部门利益下的集体决策与投票博弈——兼论人事管理中的集体决策逻辑

Collective Decision and Voting based on Department Interests——The Logic of Collective Decision in Personnel Management

部门利益下的集体决策与投票由于影响因素的不同可能会得出许多不同的结果。在建立基于利益相关部门之间、利益相关部门与其他部门之间、利益无关的各个部门之间视角下的假设基础上,讨论了这三种情况下对集体决策与投票的影响模型,分析其在实际运行中的可能性。通过对三种博弈模型的分析与归纳,探讨了公共部门人事管理中的集体决策逻辑。

Due to different factors, the collective decisions and voting of department interests may result in different results. From the following perspective, such as internal interests relevant departments, relevant departments with other departments and none-related interests departments, based on the above assumption, this paper discusses the influence model of collective decisions and voting under the three circumstances and analyzes the possibility in practical operation. This paper simply discusses the collective decision logic in the personnel management of public sector through the analysis and conclusion of the three game models.