再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究

Study on Game and Learning between OEM and UOEM in Remanufacturing Market

在再制造利益的驱动下,一些非原始设备制造商(UOEM)欲进入再制造市场。为探究UOEM参与再制造的进入博弈,应用演化博弈理论构建了原始设备制造商(OEM)和UOEM策略选择的复制动态。研究表明:博弈双方的回收价格、UOEM排除障碍的成本会影响UOEM的策略选择;OEM选择默许而潜在的UOEM进入再制造品市场是二维动态系统唯一的演化稳定策略。进一步考虑了参与人的学习行为,将噪声项引入复制动态方程中,得到了一个非子博弈完美均衡,即当带着噪声项的OEM采取竞争策略时,进入者的最优策略是置身于市场之外。

Motivated by the interests of remanufacturing , some un-original equipment manufacturers （ UOEM） wish to enter the remanufacturing market .In order to investigate the entry game of UOEM , the replicator dynamics between original equipment manufacturers （ OEM ） and UOEM is formulated by evolutionary game theory .The results show that UOEM ’ s evolutionary direction is influenced by buyback prices and the cost of eliminating ob-stacles .In addition , the unique evolutionary stable strategy of the dynamics is that UOEM enter remanufacturing market and OEM give an implied consent .Furthermore , the players ’ learning behavior is considered and another asymptotic attractor is given by perturbed replicator dynamics , which is not a sub-game perfect equilibrium .That is, when OEM with noise choose their strategy , the optimal strategy of the entrants is not to compete in the market .