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省长更替对不同所有制企业投资影响的实证分析

Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Local Governor Turnover on Different Ownership Firms' Investment
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摘要 本文基于1998-2013年上市企业的样本,根据企业的所有制形式将其分为国有企业和民营企业,匹配期间31个省级行政区122位省长的更替数据,实证考察了省长更替对不同所有制企业投资的影响。研究发现:省长更替后,国有企业的投资显著增加,而民营企业的投资显著下降,国有企业投资的增加对民营企业投资存在挤出效应;省长更替后企业的投资效率下降,且民营企业投资效率的下降更为明显,存在一定的资本配置扭曲;省长更替后国有企业投资的增加主要是由正常更替、年龄较低、学历较低和在籍贯所在地上任的新省长造成的。 Based on the samples of listed companies from 1998 to 2013, according to the form of the firm ’s ownership it can be divided into state-owned firms and private firms, matching the period 31 provincial-level administrative regions 122 Governor’s turnover data, this paper empirically examines the effect of governorturnover on different ownership firms’ investment. The study found that after the governor turnover, a significant increase in investment in state-owned firms, while the investment of private firms decreased significantly, increased investment in state-owned enterprise has a crowding out effect on the investment of private enterprises. After the governor turnover, a decline in investment efficiency of the firms, and private firms’ investment efficiency reduction is more obvious, there is a distortion of capital allocation. Increasedinvestment in state-owned firms after the governor turnover mainly by normal turnover, lower age, lower education, and new governor took office in the place of origin location caused.
作者 李丙金
出处 《未来与发展》 2015年第2期44-52,共9页 Future and Development
基金 宁波市软科学项目(2013A10034):宁波市省级高新技术企业研发中心创新驱动发展效应评价研究 宁波市自然基金项目(2013A610283):科技创新型中小企业生命周期各阶段金融配套扶持实施工程研究 宁波工程学院文科振兴计划 西北大学博士后基金资助
关键词 地方官员更替 所有制 企业投资 挤出效应 投资效率 local officials turnover ownership firm investment crowding out effect investment efficiency
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