财政分权背景下地方政府教育支出行为研究

Studies on Local Government Education Expenditure Behavior under the Context of Fiscal Decentralization

通过对第一代和第二代财政分权理论的梳理,本文探讨了财政分权改革与地方政府教育支出行为问题。研究认为,"财政分权、政治集权"的体制导致我国地方政府教育支出存在"重物轻教"、"重城轻乡"、"重物轻师"等行为偏差,此种状况对教育公平和资源配置效率均带来不利影响。改革政府绩效考核机制,完善教育转移支付制度,建立民众广泛参与的机制,有助于增强地方政府对民众需求的回应性,规范政府教育支出行为,促进教育事业健康发展。

Based on the teasing of First and Second Generation Fiscal Federalism,this paper explores the fiscal decentralization revolution and the local government education expenditure behaviors in China.The research indicates that under the context offiscal decentralization and political centralization ＂,Chinese local governments have behavior preferences ofInfrastructureBias＂,Urban-Bias ＂,Educational Infrastructure-Bias＂ etc,which are harmful for education equity and efficiency of education resource allocation.Reforming the mechanism of government evaluation,improving educational transfer institution and building common people-based restraining mechanism would reverse the behavior preference bias in education expenditure,enforcing the response of need of citizen and reconstructing the institution to improve education development in order.