公平偏好下双渠道供应链改进收入共享契约与协调

Dual-channel Supply Chain Coordination with a New Revenue-sharing Contract Incorporating Fairness Preference

在市场需求是随机的且受零售商努力水平影响的一般情形下,考虑零售商的不利不公平厌恶偏好,研究设计双渠道供应链协调的改进收入共享契约机制.结果表明,在一定的契约参数取值条件下,双渠道供应链能够实现协调.双渠道供应链协调时,制造商完全占有直销渠道的销售收入.研究结论拓展了收入共享契约协调供应链的理论研究.

For the general case of the non-linear stochastic demand affected by the sales effort of the retailer,this paper designed a new revenue-sharing contract to coordinate dual-channel supply chain incorporating the retailer＇s disadvantageous inequity aversion.The result shows that,as long as the values of the contract parameters meet certain conditions,the dual-channel supply chain can achieve coordination.The manufacturer holds the direct channel＇s sales revenue completely when the channel achieves coordination.The conclusion expands the theory research of the revenue-sharing contract to coordinate supply chain.