市场化进程、企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益

Marketization、Firm Performance and Managerial Excessive Private Income

制度环境是影响我国高管薪酬契约发挥激励作用的重要因素,本文以市场化进程为背景,检验企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的关系,并探究市场化进程对上述关系的影响。研究发现:由于我国上市公司高管隐性薪酬契约普遍缺乏有效设计和监督,企业上期绩效与本期高管过度隐性私有收益负相关;随着市场化进程深入,民营企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系显著缓解,并且当民营企业高管权力较大时,市场化进程能够更加有效地抑制企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系,但是上述关系在国有企业中并未得到有效改善。进一步检验发现,市场化改革促使企业绩效和高管现金薪酬之间的相关性不断提高。本文的研究结果有助于揭示市场力量在提高高管薪酬契约激励有效性时发挥的作用及遇到的困难,为抑制国企高管过度隐性私有收益提供合理建议。

Institutional environment is an important factor in the incentive impact of executive compensation contracts. Using Marketization as a background, we examine the relationship between firm performance and the managerial excessive private income, and the impact of Marketization on these relations. We find that own to the absence of the validity design and supervisal, the firm performance of last period has a significant negative relation with managerial excessive private income. As the marketization speeding up, the negative relationship between firm performance of last period and managerial excessive private income has been significant relieved in the Non -SOE firms, and the influence is more significant if the CEO power is bigger. While the negative relationship between firm performance of last period and managerial excessive private income has not been relieved in the SOE firms. Also we find that the positive relationship between firm performance with managerial cash compensation has been great improved in the process of Marketization. Our research provides the theory support for the role of supervision of policy and the public moral restriction with the contract mechanism and the market mechanism in the governance of the self - interests behavior of the executive perks.