不对称需求扰动信息模式下的竞争供应链信息披露模型研究

Research of Disclosure Model in the Competing Supply Chains with the Asymmetric Information on Demand Disruption

在竞争供应链有需求扰动发生,且一条链扰动信息共享、另一条链扰动信息不共享的情况下,通过最优化理论与博弈论的信息机制设计原理,研究了渠道成员的最优决策问题以及信息共享对最优决策的影响,并且得到了不同情况下的均衡解以及订购量的鲁棒性范围,发现了批发价总是会随着扰动的发生而变化,而只有在扰动足够大的时候,订购量才会产生相应的变化,且零售商的利润总是为零,供应商总是获得整个渠道的利润。

We study the optimal solution of the competing supply chains with the asymmetric information on demand disruption and the effects of information sharing on the optimal solution by means of optimization theory and information mechanism design principles of game theory. Through this study,we obtain the Nash equilibrium in different situations and the robustness range of the order quantity. We also find that the whole sale price always change because of the disruption. Only the disruption is large enough,the order quantity will change. No matter whether the retailers share their private information with his supplier,the suppliers always obtain the whole channel＇s profit while the retailers only get the reservation profit.