试析博弈困境的两种解决方案——以旅行者困境为例

An Analysis on Two Solutions of Game Dilemmas

在博弈困境中,纳什均衡所预测的博弈解与人们的直观相矛盾,而且越来越多的博弈实验表明,这与现实博弈的结果也存在巨大反差。博弈困境的出现引起了人们对经典博弈论理性预设的质疑,从而提出不同的逻辑模型和解决方案。本文以旅行者困境为例,对Halpern&Pass提出的重复后悔度最小化模型和Capraro提出的基于联盟与合作的概率推理模型两种方案进行分析比较,考察它们是如何成功地解释和预测旅行者困境中选手实际博弈行为,并对这两种方案的普适性问题和应用前景进行了展望,同时对博弈论的基础进行了哲学反思。

In game dilemmas,the game solutions that Nash Equilibrium predict are contradictory with human being's intuitions.The game dilemmas give rise to some questionings on rational assumptions of the standard game theory.Hereby some logical models and solutions are proposed.In this paper,taking the Traveler's Dilemma as an example,we make a comparative study on the model of iterated regret minimization proposed by Halpern & Pass(2011)and the probabilistic reasoning model based on coalition and cooperation proposed by Capraro(2013).We show that how the two new solutions can successfully resolve the Traveler's Dilemma,and point out some problems when they are generalized and applied in other game dilemmas.Finally,we give some philosophical reflections on the foundations of game theory.