管理层盈利预测影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性吗

Does The Management Earning Forecast Influence Pay-performance Sensitivity?

管理层盈利预测作为一项公司内部治理机制,在公司治理中发挥着重要作用。以2002-2011年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层盈利预测对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现:管理层盈利预测对高管薪酬业绩敏感性呈显著抑制作用;进一步分组回归结果表明,国有企业相对于非国有企业,其管理层盈利预测对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的抑制作用更强。该研究丰富了有关管理层盈利预测的研究文献,将管理层盈利预测引入高管薪酬业绩敏感性的讨论。

As an internal governance mechanism of a company, the management earnings lore cast plays an important role in corporate governance. With 2002～2011 Shanghai and Shenzhen Lis ted corporation as a sample, an empirical test of the impact on executive pay-performance sensitivity of management earnings forecasts has been inducted. The study iound the management earning forecast has a significant inhibitory effect on the pay--performance sensitivity; further grouping re gression results indicate that the substitution effect is slightly stronger state--owned listed corpora tions than the non state owned listed corporations taking. This study enriches the research litera ture on management earnings forecasts, taking the management earnings forecast into the reseayck of executive pay performance sensitivity.