风险投资、高管薪酬及董事会特征——公司治理视角被引量：8

Venture Capital,Management Compensation and Board Characteristics:Evidence from the View of Corporate Governance

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摘要本文采用2005-2013年上市公司作为样本,研究了风险投资机构对上市公司高管薪酬与董事会特征的作用机制。结果发现:风险投资参与不仅可以显著降低高管薪酬,而且可以显著提升高管持股比例。同时,具有高持股比例、高声誉、联合投资的风险投资机构可以降低公司高管薪酬,并对高管持股比例的提升具有显著的正向效应。不同特征的风险投资机构参与对董事会特征均有不同方向的显著影响。 This paper studies the impact of venture capital on management compensation and board characteristics mechanism of listed company using 2005-2013 data. The results find that the venture capital institute can not only help listed companies reduce the management compensation, but also improve the management share holding significantly. Further research also shows that the VC-specific factors including shareholding, syndication, and reputation shape the role of VC in the management compensation and the management share holding. The different characteristics of ven- ture capital institute have different effect on duality, board size and the proportion of independent directors.

作者赵玮温军

机构地区西安交通大学经济与金融学院

出处《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期34-45,共12页 Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

关键词风险投资高管薪酬董事会特征 Venture Capital Management Compensation Board Characteristics

分类号 F830.59 [经济管理—金融学]

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