期刊文献+

上游企业进入模式对供应链成员决策的影响 被引量:4

Impact of upstream entry mode on supply chain members'strategies
下载PDF
导出
摘要 为研究产品质量差异对外来企业进入模式和供应链成员决策的影响,建立了上游企业进入模型。研究表明,进入带来的竞争迫使在位企业降低定价,削弱供应链"双重边际效应",增加消费者的价值剩余。在进入者选择直销(模式RD)、通过在位零售商(模式R)和非在位零售商(模式RR)销售其产品的三种模式中,模式R对零售商最有利,模式RR对制造商最有利;当质量差异较大时进入者选择模式RD;否则选择模式RR。当质量差异较大时,制造商提供的利润共享合约不仅可以实现自身利润最大化,还可以实现供应链协调,但进入者进入影响协调利润的分配比例,即影响在位者的谈判能力;当质量差异很小时,制造商不提供利润共享合约,即在位企业独立决策为最优策略。 To investigate the impact of product quality diversity on entry mode and incumbent firms' decisions, the entry model for upstream enterprises was established. The results showed that the competition could weaken the negative effects of double-marginalization and increase customer surplus value. In the three alternative modes of sell- ing directly (mode RD), selling through the incumbent retailer (mode R) and selling through another retailer (mode RR), the incumbent retailer preferred mode R and the incumbent manufacturer preferred mode RR. The entrant supplier preferred mode RD when his product quality was far less than the incumbent product quality, otherwise, he preferred mode RR. A profit sharing contract provided by the incumbent manufacturer could increase his profit, but also coordinate the supply chain when his product quality was far higher than that of the entrant. In such a case, the entry could affect a profit allocation proportion that the negotiation ability between the incumbent firms. Otherwise, independent decision making without coordinating the retailer was optimal for the manufacturer.
出处 《计算机集成制造系统》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2015年第3期776-787,共12页 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金 国家社科基金资助项目(12CGL041 11CGL029) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131003 71201044 71101002) 合肥工业大学博士学位专项基金资助项目(2012HGBZ0197) 安徽农业大学学科骨干培育资助项目(2014XKPY-33)~~
关键词 供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 利润共享合约 进入模式 supply chains Stackelberg game profit sharing contract entry mode
  • 相关文献

参考文献27

  • 1CHO D S, KIM D J, RHEE D K. Latecomer strategies., evi- dence from the semiconductor industry in Japan and Korea[J].Organization Science, 1998,9(4) : 489-505.
  • 2CHURCH J, GANDAL N. Strategic entry deterrence: com- plementary products as installed base[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 1996,12 (2) :331-354.
  • 3BOYER M, MAHENC P, MOREAUX M. Entry preventing locations under incomplete information[J]. International Jour- nal of Industrial Organization, 2003,21 (6) : 809-829.
  • 4LUKACH R, KORT P M, PLASMANS J. Optimal Rb-D in- vestment strategies under the threat of new technology entry [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007,25 (1) : 103-119.
  • 5CHRISTIN C. Entry deterrence through cooperative RD o- ver-Investment[J]. Louvain Economic Review, 2013, 79 (2) 5 26.
  • 6INGENE C A, PARRY M E. Is channel coordination all it is cracked up to be[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2000, 76(4): 511-547.
  • 7UTAKA A. Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry de- terrence[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008,26 (4) : 878-888.
  • 8CHEN Y, XIE J. Cross-market network effect with asymmet ric customer loyalty: implications for competitive advantage [J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(1) :52-66.
  • 9PEIFZ M. Bundling may blockade entry [J ]. InternationM Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008,26 (1) : 41-58.
  • 10CHEN Y T. Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion[J]. Journal of Economics, 2011,102(2) : 137-156.

二级参考文献22

  • 1刘春林.多零售商供应链系统的契约协调问题研究[J].管理科学学报,2007,10(2):1-6. 被引量:44
  • 2Bae H. Product innovation, sell-off, and entry deterrence [ J ]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20 (4) : 577 -588.
  • 3Simon D. Incumbent pricing responses to entry[ J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2005, 26 (13) : 1229 -1248.
  • 4Hauser J R, Sbugan S M. Defensive marketing strategies[ J]. Marketing Science, 2008, 27 ( 1 ) : 88 - 110.
  • 5Seade J. On the effects of entry[J]. Econometrica, 1980, 48(2): 479-489.
  • 6Amir R, Lambson V E. On the effects of entry in Cournot markets[ J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67 (2) : 235 - 254.
  • 7Tyagi R K. On the effects of downstream entry[ J]. Management Science, 1999, 45 (1): 59 -73.
  • 8Bernstein F, Federgruen A. Pricing and replenishment strategies in a distribution system with competing retailers [ J ]. Op- erations Research, 2003, 51 (3): 409-426.
  • 9Bernstein F, Federgruen A. Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty [ J]. Manage- ment Science, 2005, 51 ( 1 ) : 18 - 29.
  • 10Arya A, Mittendorf B, Sappington D E M. The make-or-buy decision in the presence of a rival: Strategic outsourcing to a common supplier[J]. Management Science, 2008, 54( 10): 1747 -1758.

共引文献10

同被引文献32

引证文献4

二级引证文献34

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部