环境公害事件泛滥的制度根源分析

An Analysis on the System Root of Unchecked Spreading of Environmental Hazards Incidents

借助法经济学的分析方法,我们发现企业宁愿受罚也偷排的秘密在于:《水污染防治法》的相关规定对偷排污的行为只处以罚款,没有同时没收违法所得,以致罚款在大多数情况下小于偷排污节省的费用,刑法相关犯罪的入罪门槛较高,又由于执法方法的原因,使偷排污的被查处风险较小,最终导致违法成本远小于违法收益。要改变这种局面,不仅要完善两部法律的规制方法,提高处罚的严厉程度,而且还要革新两种监督制约机制,提高法律的贯彻执行力。

Through analysis by methods in economics of law,it is found why enterprises choose to secretly discharge pollutants at the risk of punishment. Relevant provisions in the Water Pollution Prevention Law don't confiscate their illegal income after imposing a fine on them for secretly discharging pollutants,and such financial penalty,in most cases,is smaller than the amount of money saved from secretly discharging pollutants. Furthermore,because of the high threshold of criminal offenses related to secretly discharging pollutants in the Criminal Law and the problems in law enforcement,chances of being punished are considerably little. These factors lead to the fact that illegal costs are far less than illegal gains. To change this situation,regulations in the two laws need further improvement so as to raise the severity of punishment,but also the two kinds of supervision mechanisms need to be innovated so that laws can be more powerfully enforced.