企业羊群投资行为来自管理者自利性动机吗?——基于国有金字塔上市公司的实证研究

Does Managerial Self-interest Lead to the Corporate Herd Investment?

本文以2004年-2010年国有上市公司为样本,分析国有企业控制层级的增加是否会增加管理者的自利性风险,并导致其采取更多的羊群投资决策。结果表明:我国国有上市公司中存在明显的羊群投资行为,这一行为主要来自国有股东控制的金字塔结构上市公司,随着金字塔层级的增加,企业羊群投资行为也显著增加。在金字塔结构的国有上市公司中,随着控制链条的延长,所有者缺位下的经理人代理风险也随之增加,导致其采取了更多的羊群投资行为。这一研究不仅支持公司羊群投资决策来自管理者自利行为的假设,还使研究者认识到,在市场机制尚未完全约束经理人代理行为之前,给国有企业设置更多的控制层级,反而会增加代理风险,扭曲投资效率。

With the data of Chinese listing SOEs from 2004-2010,this paper empirically studies whether the pyramid layer of stated-owned enterprise(SOE)will stimulate the managerial self-interest and cause the herd investment.The finding shows that:there is obvious herd behavior on investment of SOEs;Compared with SOEs directly controlled by the government,the corporate herd investment mainly happens in SOEs with the pyramid structure controlled by stated shareholders;the corporate herd investment significantly increases with the increment of pyramid layers of SOEs.The results is interpreted by that the extension of control layers in SOE will increase the agency risk and lead to more herding behavior.The finding not only supports the hypothesis that managerial self-interest leads to the corporate herd investment,but also has an important practical application meaning that the increment of control level in SOEs may increase agency risk and distort investment efficiency in the market where the agent behavior of managers has not yet been fully constraint.