工资制度与发展中国家的反腐败改革

Wage System and Anti-corruption Reform in Developing Countries

从反腐败改革与经济效率是否激励相容的角度,结合经济发展的二元特征,探讨发展中国家政府的工资制度选择及其可能导致的"腐败陷阱"。研究表明:政府若选择效率工资制度,则提高腐败查处力度就会降低效率工资水平,进而提高社会总产出和相应的福利水平;若选择"姑息工资"制度,提高腐败查处概率就需相应提高官员的补偿工资,从而会导致更多的扭曲性税收。"姑息工资"制度会引发"腐败陷阱"。反腐改革在短期内可能导致经济下滑,此时减少腐败收入等措施更加有效。为兼顾经济增长,反腐改革的事前预防要比事后惩罚更为有效。

From the perspective of incentive compatibility between anti-corruption reform and economic efficiency,and combined with dual economic structure,this paper explores the option of government officers＇ wage system and the resulted ＂corruption trap＂. When the government chooses efficiency wage system,enhancing supervision over corruption can cut down efficiency wage,which will reduce its government＇s wage expenditures,and increase total outputs and social welfare correspondingly. On the contrary,when the government chooses capitulation wage system,enhancing the probability of investigation over corruption can only raise officers＇ wage,which will lead to more distorted taxes and reduce social welfare. Capitulation wage system tends to trigger ＂corruption trap＂,in which anti-corruption reform may bring about economic decline during the short time. In order to be compatible with economic efficiency,ex ante preventative actions such as reducing grey incomes can be more effective than ex post punitive actions such as enhancing supervision.