散户参与家庭农场的稳定性分析——基于随机演化博弈视角

Analysis of the Stability of Small Farmers Participating in Family Farm——Based on the Random Evolution Game Theory

家庭农场在我国是一种新兴的农业生产组织形式,它的规模效益取决于散户流转到家庭农场主体的土地等资源,稳定的散户群体是确保家庭农场正常运转的基础。然而,散户的决策易受周围人或事物的影响,具有随机性。文章运用演化博弈理论,在散户的人均收益、放弃其他产业的机会成本以及具有约束性质的惩罚成本等因素之基础上增加随机项,构建含有随机项的复制动态方程,并得出判断散户参与家庭农场稳定性的依据,通过契约调整和制度建设能够实现家庭农场的稳定发展。最后文章基于安徽省家庭寄卖数据对模型进行数值模拟,提出相关政策建议。

Family farm is a kind of new agriculture production organization form. Its economies of scale depend on the resource of land which flow to the subject of family farm. The stable group of small farmers is the basis which could ensure the family farm running normally. However, the small farmers are easier to be effected by the people or matters around them,it present some kind of random.This article utilizing the evolution game theory, adding stochastic term based on factors including small farmer＇s earning per person,opportunity cost of abandoning other industries,and penalty cost with the character of restraining,building replicator dynamic equation with stochastic term, obtaining the criterion to the stability of small farmers participate family farm, realize the family farm＇s stable development through contract adjustment and institutional improvement. Finally, this article simulates the model using the data from Anhui and obtains relevant policy suggestions.