期刊文献+

布坎南混合型经济学研究纲领的演变--从契约理论到知识理论

The Evolution of Research Programme of Buchanan's Constitutional Economics—— From Contract Theory to Knowledge Theory
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摘要 在1986年获得诺贝尔经济学奖之后,布坎南的宪法理论发生了明显的奥地利学派化,他淡化了"维克塞尔模式"的内容,而扩展了"哈耶克领域"的因素。布坎南将知识理论引入了自身的研究纲领之中,试图与原有的契约论方法形成互补。契约理论与知识理论的结合产生出了一个混合的宪政经济学研究纲领。由于布坎南坚持使用理性方法来解决立宪时的知识问题,新的研究纲领存在内在的紧张。实质上,紧张源于在规则问题上两种进路——"休谟-哈耶克"式的不可知论与"康德-罗尔斯"式的理性主义——之间的冲突。康德传统所代表的进路强调以理性来设计规则,而休谟传统所代表的进路则主张规则的自发演化。哈耶克和布坎南的工作都是综合性的,相对而言,哈耶克更偏向休谟,而布坎南则更接近康德。 After winning the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan's constitutional theory happens a obvious transtition to Austrian school----he fades out the contents of"Wicksellian setting" and enlarges the elements of "Hayekian realm". Buchanan imports knowlegde theory of Austrian school into his research program, he hopes it can be complementary with contract theory. The unite of contract theory and knowledge theory produces a hybrid research program of constitutional economics. Because of insisting on using rational approach to resolve knowledge issue, there are intrinsic contradictions in new program research. In essence, controdiction results from the incoordination of two kinds of rule paradigm: "the ignorance theory of Hume-Hayek" and "the rationalism of Kant-Rawls". The tradition of Kant emphasizes on how to design rules by rationality, and the tradition of Hume acclaims on the spontaneous evolution of rules. The works of Hayek and Buchanan are all comprehensiv. Relatively, Hayek is inclined to agree with Hume, and Buchanan is closer to Kant. Buchanan and Hayek all realize that the constitutionalism construction has the property of culture-dependence, this idea has important enlightments to Chinese reform.
作者 汪毅 霖罗影
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期79-94,共16页 Academic Monthly
基金 国家重大科研计划973项目“气候变化与气候保护中的全球经济问题”(2012CB955802) 国家社会科学基金青年项目“福利理论进展及其在基本公共服务均等化中的应用研究”(13CJL014) 国家社会科学基金一般项目“省域尺度下区域人类发展的空间测度与空间模型研究”(13BTJ018)的阶段性成果
关键词 宪政经济学 契约 知识 奥地利学派 constitutional economics, contract, knowledge, Austrian school
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