摘要
研究在不确定性条件下由一个理性供应商和一个过度自信零售商组成的供应链协调契约模型.考虑由Wang和Webster(2007)提出的得失共享回购契约,在该契约下得到零售商最优订货量及其性质.进一步证明在一定条件下,该契约能协调供应链.特别地,讨论三类特殊契约模型:回购契约,得失共享批发价契约和批发价契约,发现在高利润条件下回购契约可使供应链协调,而在低利润条件下得失共享批发价契约和批发价契约可使供应链协调.
In the uncertainty condition, we study a supply chain with a rational sup- plier and a overconfident retailer. Firstly, we introduce a contract that is Gain/Loss- sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract. We show that the equation about the optimal order quantity and the sufficient condition leads the coordination with the GLB con- tract. Secondly, we introduce two particular cases for GLB contract: Buyback con- tract and Gain/Loss-sharing (GL) wholesale contract. Regarding these two contracts, we obtained the optimal order and the monotonieity of the olgtimal order auantitv on the overconfident level. Meanwhile, we also show that the buyback contract could co- ordinate the supply chain in the high profits conditions. The Gain/Loss-sharing (GL) wholesale contract and the wholesale contract could coordinate the supply chain in the low profits conditions.
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第1期121-128,共8页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金(70971001)
北京工业大学研究生科技基金(ykj-2013-9905)资助课题
关键词
过度自信
得失共享回购契约
批发价契约
供应链协调
Overconfidence, gain/Loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract, whole-sale contract, supply chain coordination.