招标选聘审计师、审计质量与审计收费

Public Bidding,Audit Quality and Audit Fees

本文研究国资委招标选聘审计师政策的实施效果。以2000年至2011年政府控股的A股上市公司为样本,研究发现:首先,经国资委通过招标选聘的审计师审计后,公司财务重述的情况显著减少。其次,通过招标选聘审计师能降低审计收费。这表明通过招标选聘审计师总体上能得到"质优价廉"的审计服务。并且中央国资委实施招标选聘审计师的效果好于各级地方国资委。最后,进一步分析发现,中央国资委招标选聘审计师时,所选聘的会计师事务所规模比较大,而地方国资委选聘的审计师则更多是本地小事务所。本文研究表明,限制央企管理层影响审计师的招标选聘审计师政策,能够提高审计质量和降低审计费用。

China's State- owned Assets Supervison and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASAC) issued rules in 2004 that assign auditors for state-owned enterprises ultimately controlled by the central government(CSOEs).This paper studies whether these rules improve audit quality and decrease audit fees.Using the data of Chinese listed State- owned enterprises(SOEs),we find that audit quality for CSOEs improves and audit fees decrease and the rules that assign auditors for state- owned enterprises ultimately controlled by the local governments(LSOEs) have no such effect on LSOEs.Further analysises express that CSOEs are more likely to hire big auditors and LSOEs are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region.Our findings suggest that limiting management influence of CSOEs helps improve audit quality and decrease audit fees.