县级政府维稳的政策规避行为分析:基于委托——代理的视角

An Analysis of the Behaviors of County Government's Policy-Evading for Maintaining Stability: from the Perspective of Principal-Agent

目前中国维稳实践中存在着较多的政策规避行为,上级政府与县级政府之间的维稳行政发包是一种政府间的委托代理行为。信息不对称和目标效用函数不一致是县级政府维稳政策规避行为产生的重要条件,县级政府具有一定的自利性和较强的自主性,为其政策规避行为提供了可能和空间,维稳考核中的弱激励和强约束的效应直接催生了政策规避行为的产生。为了防止维稳政策规避行为的发生,应建立一套激励兼容约束的机制,谨慎使用维稳考核"一票否决",重视对维稳基础性工作的考核。

In the process of China＇s maintaining stability, there are a lot of behaviors of policy-evading. Administrative subcontract of maintaining stability between higher level government and county government is a relation of principal-agent. The asymmetric information and the discord of objective utility function are signifi cant condition for the county government＇s maintaining stability policy-evading behaviors, egoism and autonomy of country government to a great degree provide the possibility and space for policy-evading behaviors, and weak incentive and strong constrain in the examination of maintaining stability directly cause policy-evading behaviors. In order to prevent the policy-evading behaviors, a mechanism of incentive compatible with constraint should be established, veto in the evaluation of maintaining stability should be prudently used and great importance should be attached to basic work for maintaining stability.