不公平厌恶条件下的闭环供应链收人费用共享契约协调

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Revenue Sharing Contract Coordination Under Inequity Aversion Condition

在不公平厌恶条件下研究闭环供应链收入费用共享契约协调问题实质是在模拟现实条件的基础上,探讨实现供应链整体最优化.在前人的研究基础上,构建基于不公平厌恶的二级闭环供应链利润模型,对比集中决策与独立决策的利润差距,得出不公平厌恶条件下的独立决策效用水平低于集中决策,再通过收入费用再分配契约改变独立决策效用,得出不公平厌恶条件下的收入费用共享契约有利于提高闭环供应链整体效用的结论.最后,提出建立收入费用共享契约约束供应链主体行为,扩大整体供应链效用的管理学建议.

Contract coordination is an important way to eliminate the double marginalization and increase the whole supply chain profits. Research closed-loop supply chain revenue sharing problem under the basement of inequity aversion condition is a more reality way to explore the game to realize the whole optimization of supply chain. On the basis of previous research, two levels of closed-loop supply chain profit model under the inequity aversion is constructed. After the comparison of profit gap between centralized decision-making and independent decision, we got that even under the condition of inequity aversion the utility of centralized decision-making is higher than independent decision. To improve the whole effectiveness of supply chain under independent decision condition, we tried to set a revenue sharing contract and changed the cost profit distribution way. In the end, conclusion obtained that revenue sharing contract under the condition of inequity aversion do good effect to improve the utility of close-loop supply chain. Finally, the cost of establishing revenue sharing contract subject behavior constrained supply chain, to expand the utility of the whole supply chain management proposal.