私募股权基金对创业板公司高管离职影响的路径分析

Impact of Private Equity Fund on Resignation by Directors and Officers of China GEM Listed Companies

针对PE基金对创业板上市公司高管离职的抑制作用,本文首次从PE基金参与被投企业公司治理从而创造公司价值和PE基金影响首次公开发行(IPO)定价两种途径,研究了PE基金以及PE基金类型对创业板高管离职的作用机理。实证结果发现:(1)相比于没有PE基金参与的创业板上市公司,PE基金的参与并不够显著的提高公司价值;(2)从PE基金管理合伙人的股东背景看,外资基金的进入能显著的提高公司价值,而国资基金和民营基金对提高公司价值的作用不显著;从特殊类型的基金看,券商直投基金降低了公司价值;(3)有PE基金参与的公司在IPO时估值泡沫显著小于无PE参与的公司;(4)从PE基金管理合伙人的股东背景视角看,外资基金的进入能显著的抑制IPO泡沫,而国资基金和民营基金对抑制IPO泡沫的作用不强;从特殊类型的基金视角看,券商直投基金增加了IPO估值泡沫。

As to the inhibitory effect of PE funds on the top management executive turnover of the listing corporations in the GEM, this paper studies the mechanism of how PE funds and PE fund style affect the top management executive turnover of the listing corporations in GEM from two perspectives： PE fund improves the corporation governance therefore adding value to the company and affects the IPO pricing of the company. The empirical results show that：（1） compared to the GEM Listing Corporation without PE fund involvement, PE fund participation does not significantly increase the value of the company;（2） from the shareholder background perspective of the PE fund management partner, foreign funds is able to significantly improve the company value, but the effect to improve the value of the company by the state-owned funds and private funds is not significant; from the specific perspective, the funds management by the direct brokerage firms reduce the value of the company;（3） with the PE funds to participate in the company IPO, the IPO pricing bubble significantly lower than that without PE funds involvement;（4） from the shareholder background perspective of the PE fund management partner, foreign funds can significantly inhibit IPO pricing bubble, but the state-owned funds and private funds are not strong on the inhibition of IPO pricing bubble; from the specific perspective, the PE funds managed by the brokerage firms increase the IPO pricing bubble.