管理层盈利预测与薪酬业绩敏感性

The Management Earning Forecast and Pay- performance Sensitivity

管理层盈利预测作为一项公司内部治理机制,在公司治理中发挥着重要作用。本研究以2002—2011年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层盈利预测对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现:管理层盈利预测对高管薪酬业绩敏感性呈显著抑制作用;进一步分组回归结果表明,国有控股上市公司盈利预测之于非国有上市公司盈利预测的替代作用稍强。该研究丰富了有关管理层盈利预测的研究文献,将管理层盈利预测引入到高管薪酬业绩敏感性的讨论。

As an internal governance mechanism of a company , the management earnings forecast plays an important role in corporate governance .With 2002~2011 years of China ’ s Shanghai and Shenzhen two city listing Corporation as a sample , an empirical test of the impact on executive pay -performance sensi-tivity of management earnings forecasts has been inducted .The study found : the management earnings forecast has a significant inhibitory effect on the pay -performance sensitivity;further grouping regression results indicate that the substitution effect is slightly stronger state -owned listing Corporation profit fore-cast to the non state owned listing Corporation earnings forecasts .This study enriches the research litera-ture on management earnings forecasts , the discussion will introduce the management earnings forecast in-to executive pay performance sensitivity .