非线性定价下的双头垄断企业行为分析

The Actions of Duopoly Under the Nonlinear Pricing

本文采用了泰勒尔的消费者基本效用函数模型 ,从消费者剩余效用最优化的角度分析了双头垄断企业的市场行为 ,得出了如下结论 :企业非线性定价条件下 ,任何类型的消费者都存在一个最优消费数量 ;双头垄断竞争有助于扩展市场、提高产品质量、降低产品价格 ;但双头垄断在非线性定价下的最终市场均衡是达到完全垄断 ,而政府管制行为可以防止完全垄断的形成 。

We use the Jean Tirole's basic customer's Utility function model, analyze the actions of duopoly by optimizing the customer's utility, and get the result: under the nonlinear price of duopoly, there exists an optimal consumption to maximize the utility for every kind of customer; the duopoly competition can expand the market,and prove the quality and lower the price; but the duopoly market competition balance will be a monopoly market, so the government's measure can prevent the monopoly, and so on.