新型城镇化生态治理下的地方政府道德风险研究

Research on Moral Risk of Local Government under Ecological Management in New Urbanization Process

在城镇化进程中利益主体的生态环境治理的博弈过程中,作为"委托人"的中央政府既要立足城镇建设规模,更要关注城镇发展的总体质量;作为代理人的地方政府,推进城镇化建设和生态环境治理犹如鱼和熊掌,难以兼得,面对发展经济和财政缺口的压力,地方政府趋向于利用不对称信息做出对社会不利的行动选择,道德风险就此产生。本文对城镇化进程中生态治理下的地方政府道德风险问题构建了博弈论数学模型,并对其选择行为进行分析,结论是要想解决新型城镇化建设中生态共治下的地方政府道德风险问题,关键取决于博弈均衡的激励相容条件,并据此得出设计制度体系的启示。

In the process of urbanization and the ecological environment governance, as the ＂client＂, the central gov- ernment should not only be based on the scale of urban construction, but also pay attention to the overall quality of urban development. Being the agent, the local government is hard to get both the advance of the urbanization con- struction and the management of ecological environment. Thus, the moral risk generated. This paper constructs a game theory problem mathematical model of local government in the process of ecological governance under the mor- al hazard of the town, and analysis its behaviors.