摘要
本文从政府补贴这只"看得见的手"以及市场竞争这只"看不见的手"的视角出发,实证研究二者对中国企业出口产品质量的影响。研究发现,政府补贴这只"看得见的手"对企业出口产品质量造成的是抑制效应,而竞争这只"看不见的手"对企业出口产品质量造成的是促进效应。不同所有制类型企业中,政府补贴对外资企业并没有形成抑制效应,而竞争对国有企业出口产品质量并未产生促进效应。政府补贴对企业出口产品质量产生抑制效应的机理是:获得政府补贴(生产成本降低)→低价格竞争→低利润发展模式(对生产性政府补贴的依赖)→企业出口产品质量提升内生动力缺失。而竞争对企业出口产品质量造成促进效应的机理是:行业竞争→企业创新研发→企业出口产品质量内生动力的提升。
From the perspective view of government subsidy which is called "visible hand" and competition which is called "invisible hand", our paper provides empirical evi- dence on the effects of these two hands on the quality of China!s export products. Based on DSM model measuring quality of export products and multi-robust estimation methods, our study finds as following. Firstly, generally speaking, the quality of export quality is de- pressed by government subsidy while promoted by competition. Secondly, in detail, subsidy does no depression effect in foreign enterprises while competition does no promotion effect in SOEs. Thirdly, on one hand, the mechanism of depression effect generates from "gaining government subsidy (producing cost decreases) →low price competition→low profit mode of development→lack of endogenous power to enhance quality of export products"; on the other hand, the mechanism of competition's promoting effects generates from "industry competition→enterprise's innovation→promotion of endogenous power to enhance quality of export products".
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期71-87,共17页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"贸易地理特征与中国出口附加值低下之谜"(41371139)
北京市自然科学基金项目"制度环境
合法性约束
市场进入和成长战略--基于北京市高科技企业的实证研究"(9132015)的资助
关键词
看得见的手
政府补贴
看不见的手
竞争
企业出口产品质量
Visible Hands
Government Subsidy
Invisible Hands
Competition
Quality of Export Products