中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争

Chinese-style Tax-Sharing System,Tax Collection Centralization and Tax Competition

本文以企业所得税制改革为研究对象,将中央政府的动态作用纳入中国地区间税收竞争关系的研究中。在理论上,本文认为,辖区问税收竞争假说相比"自上而下的税收标尺竞争"假说更适宜解释中国地区间税收策略互动关系;中国式分税制不存在类似于西方联邦体制中的纵向税收竞争问题;共享税制下中央政府有动机集中税收征管权来压缩地方政府税收竞争的空间。在实证上,本文采用动态空间工具变量模型检验了2002—2007年间中央税收征管权集中对地区间横向税收竞争的影响。实证结果显示,在所有权重下,地区间存在一定程度的横向税收竞争关系,中央税收征管权集中提高了实际税率;更为重要地,中央集中税收征管权降低了地区间横向税收竞争程度。

Focusing on the corporate tax reform in China, the paper puts the dynamic role of the central government into the tax eompetition between provinces. In theory, the point of views in this paper is, comparing to the hypothesis of ＂top-down yardstick competition＂, the hypothesis of tax competition between jurisdictions is more suitable to explain the tax strategic interaction between Chinese regions; Chinese-style tax-sharing system could mainly avoid the vertical tax competition issues ; the center government has an incentive to increase the extent of tax collection centralization to eompress the space of tax competition between local governments. In the empirical, the paper uses the dynamic spacial instrumental variables model to test the effects of tax collection centralization on tax competition between provinces during 2002-2007. The empirical results show that, there was some extent of tax competition between regions, tax collection centralization increased the effective tax rate and offseted the level of tax competition between provinces.