中国产业政策的最优实施空间界定——补贴效应、竞争兼容与过剩破解

Defining the Optimal Space of China Industrial Policy—Subsidy Effect,Competition Compatible and Overcapacity Solution

自20世纪90年代中期引起广泛讨论的"东亚奇迹"争辩后,中国近年来出现的"战略性新兴产业也过剩"现象再一次引起国内外各界对政策干预有效性的普遍关注。中国产业政策似乎长期陷入"刺激—过剩—淘汰—再刺激"的循环路径。基于一个拓展的"2×2"伯川德模型,本文显化了以不同方式施行的补贴可以产生不同政策效果的理论机制,即以竞争兼容方式施行的补贴可通过扩大竞争,抵冲补贴对创新的负面影响并获取创新激励效应,但行业存在一个有效竞争阈值,当竞争程度已经过高时,继续施加补贴会降低企业对行业竞争压力的敏感性,引致企业"为补贴而生产"和产能过剩风险。本文的核心结论是:产业政策存在一个以行业竞争程度等行业异质性为特征的最优实施空间,越偏离最优实施空间,施政效果可能越会背离政策制定者的初衷。基于此,本文提出了一个具有较高适用性和系统性的中国产业政策优化设计框架。

After the worldwide disputation about ＂East Asia miracle＂ in menon overcapacity of strategic emerging industries in China now attracts the mid-1990s, the new widespread attention to the government intervention policy once again. China industrial policy seems to fall into the circular path ＂stimulation- extension-elimination- stimulation＂. Based on the extended ＂2×2＂ Bertrand model, this paper found the theoretical mechanism through which subsidy policy show different results just because it＇s different implementation methods. Subsidy policy can gets more incentive effects of innovation if it implemented in a competitive way, but when the degree of market competition surpass a certain limit, ongoing subsidies would reduce the sensitivity of enterprises to the industry competition pressure, and cause the risk of ＂production only in order to obtain subsidies＂ and overcapacity. The core conclusion of this article is that there exists the ＂optimal space＂ for industrial policy which based on industry characteristics. If industrial policy deviate more from the optimal space, the policy effect would expected to be inefficient. Based on these insights, we propose a high operational and systematic optimization framework for optimizing the Chinese industrial policy.