科斯谈判视角下农村环境污染机制研究

A Study on the Mechanism of Rural Environment Pollution on the View of Coase Negotiation

与抽象的理论不同,现实中的环境污染具有内生性。中国农村环境污染的内生性在于,城乡二元化的经济结构使经济主体之间难以平等、有效地进行财产权利的交易,资源环境的扭曲性定价机制激励厂商和农民过度使用相对廉价的农村资源环境,环境监管套利使环境污染持续地转嫁到农村,而农村环境污染的整个过程缺乏内在的有效约束机制。解决农村环境污染问题,关键在于纠正扭曲性的分配关系,并且能够塑造有助于实现科斯谈判的制度环境和建立有效的环境监控体系。

Different from the abstract theory,environment pollution in practice is endogenous. The endogencity of China＇s rural environment pollution lies in the following aspects： the urban and rural dual economic structure does not keep the trade of property and rights equal and efficient,the distorted pricing system of resources and environment stimulates firms＇ and farmers＇ misuse of the cheaper rural resources and environment,and the environmental regulatory arbitrage permits environment pollution be continuously overflowed to rural districts. While the whole procedure of rural environment pollution lacks internal efficient restriction mechanism. The key of resolving the problems of rural environment pollution is to rectify the distorted distribution relationship. Besides,the economic society has to cultivate the institution environment which would help to realize the Coase negotiation and to set up efficient environmental monitoring and controlling system.