考虑工作能力的团队合作与激励设置动态博弈模型研究

Study on team incentive structure design considering work ability game model

团队合作中,不同成员工作能力不一样并且具有一定可观测性。工作能力影响员工付出努力的边际成本和员工对报酬的预期,从而影响委托人激励设置。构建团队生产两阶段博弈模型,研究成员的均衡努力水平和协作水平以及委托人的最优激励设置。研究发现,团队成员工作能力越高,团队中的合作状态就越好,成员的努力水平和协作水平均会提升;委托人对团队成员的激励设置根据员工工作能力不同有很大区别,对于团队中的高工作能力的成员,委托人以对团队总产出的激励为主,对个人产出几乎不予以激励;而工作能力较低的员工,委托人会通过对其个人产出给予一定的激励来激发其参与团队合作的积极性。

Members＇ work abilities are different and observable in team work. Capacity influence the employees＇ marginal cost of effort and reward expectation, thereby affecting incentive structure of principal. In this paper, a two - staged game model was established to study the team members＇ equilibrium effort for his own task and collab- orative effort for his fellow＇ s task, also the optimal incentive design of the principal. The research found ： the high- er employee＇ s work ability, the better state of cooperation. Effort both for his or her own work and other＇ s work improve with the promotion of work ability. Incentive structure principal is very different because of employee＇ s a- bility. To employee with high capacity, the incentive structure is mainly about team output, hardly individual out- put. But to employee with low capacity, a certain of incentive for the individual output is provided to stimulate his or her enthusiasm to take part in team cooperation.