意图与有意图的行动

Intention and Intentional Action

意图与有意图的行动之间的关系是行动哲学的一个重要问题。对于这个问题,有两种针锋相对的观点,即意图优先进路与有意图的行动优先进路。本文试图表明,意图优先进路是行不通的。任何将有意图的行动分解为意图和中性要素的做法都会在它们之间产生一个无法填平的裂隙。因此,应该像有意图的行动优先进路一样,将有意图的行动看作是形而上学意义上基本的自然类,用它来解释意图。这意味着,在实践理性领域,占中心地位的是有意图的行动而不是意图。

One of the most important questions in the philosophy of action is the relationship between intention and intentional action. With regard to this question, there are two tit-for-tat viewpoints, namely, the intention-first approach and the intentional-action-first approach. This paper aims to show that the intention-first approach is untenable. Any theory which tries to analyze intentional action into intention and other neutral factoris bound to create an unbridgeable gap between intention and intentional action. Therefore, it is more plausible to treat intentional action as a metaphysically fundamental and natural kind and to explain intention in term of intentional action. If these ideas are tenable, then we can conclude that it is intentional action rather than intention that occupies the central place in the domain of practical reason.