基于EPR的供应链治理机制博弈分析

Game analysis on supply chain governance mechanism based on extended producer responsibility

研究了生产者责任延伸(EPR)制度背景下的供应链系统中主体决策影响因素和治理机制的融合问题,基于供应链治理和博弈的理论视角,构造了个体生产者责任(IPR)模式下的非合作博弈模型和集体生产者责任(CPR)模式下的合作博弈模型,分别得出了IPR和CPR模式下企业污染治理技术的最佳决策.研究结果表明,企业的污染治理决策主要取决于企业之间生产技术的差距,以及相互依赖程度.强技术差距和强依赖性更容易导致CPR模式的产生;反之,IPR模式更容易出现在低依赖性和实力相当的企业当中.最后总结了EPR制度下供应链系统动态均衡治理的内部效率机制和外部合法性机制.

Within the context of extended producer responsibility （EPR） policy, this study adopts a governance perspective to investigate the problem of integration for supply chain decision-making factors and governance mechanisms. Based on game theory, this paper builds cooperative game models under the individual producer responsibility （IPR） game mode and the collective producer responsibility （IPR） game mode, and obtains op- timal decisions of enterprises＇ pollution governance technology in both modes. Results show that the optimal decision depends largely on the technological gap and the degree of reliance among enterprises. Large tech- nological gap and strong degrees of reliance make the CPR mode more applicable. The IPR mode is more likely to be adopted by companies with weak degree of reliance. Finally, this paper summarizes the efficiency and legitimacy mechanism of the dynamic equilibrium governance in the supply chain system from both the internal and external perspectives under the EPR policy.