大股东会侵犯管理层利益吗？--来自资金占用与管理层人员变更的经验证据

Will Managers be Hurt by Large Shareholder?Evidence from Tunneling and Managers' Turnover

本文关注了中国制度背景下,大股东与管理层的利益冲突问题。资金占用会激化大股东与管理层之间的冲突,大股东资金占用越多,管理层人员变更的可能性越大。本文使用1999-2010年中国上市公司数据进行检验,发现:(1)资金占用对管理层变更有显著影响,资金占用每增加一个标准差,管理层变更概率增加2.79%;(2)资金占用情况不同的公司,其高管能力(教育水平)不存在明显差异,资金占用对管理层人员变更的影响在国有企业与非国有企业均存在,且在国有企业关系相对较弱;(3)资金占用与管理层人员变更的关系仅存在于股权分置改革之前,股权分置改革之后消失。文章为理解大股东资金占用的经济后果提供了新的视角,也从管理层人员变更的角度提供了大股东资金占用不利于企业经营发展的一个具体路径。

This paper focuses on the conflicts between large shareholder and managers under Chinese institutional environment. We infer that tunneling by large shareholder will increase the probability of managers＇ turn- over. Using data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2010, we find that： （ 1 ） Tunneling affects the prob- ability of managers＇ turnover significantly. A one standard deviation increase in tunneling is associated with a 2. 79% increase in the probability of managers＇ turnover. （2） The difference of managers＇ ability （education） among companies with different quality of tunneling is insignificant. The link between tunneling and managers＇ turnover exist in both SOEs and Non - SOEs. But the link in SOEs is weaker. （ 3 ） The link is weaker after Split - share reform. This paper not only provides a new perspective to the consequences of tunneling, but also offers a detail path of the negative effects of tunneling to performance.