相对业绩评价和CEO薪酬——基于董事联结的分析被引量：4

Relative Performance Evaluation in CEOs' Compensation——An Analysis Based on the Board Interlocks

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摘要如何选择参照公司是利用相对业绩评价制定CEO薪酬政策的关键。文章基于董事联结的信息传递功能,考察了董事联结关系是否影响相对业绩评价中的参照公司选择,采用2005~2012年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果表明：CEO的薪酬与董事联结公司业绩显著负相关,与市场综合指数收益、同行业公司业绩、同行业-规模公司业绩都不相关;国有公司的CEO薪酬和董事联结公司的业绩相关度更低,外资参股公司的CEO薪酬和董事联结公司的业绩相关度更高。 This study investigates the impact of board interlocks on relative performance evaluation（RPE）in CEO＇s compensation contracts. Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2005-2012, we find that CEO＇s compensation is negatively associated with the performance of firms which have board interlocks with the CEOs＇ host firm, and is not related to the performance of market indexes,the firms in the same industry, and the firms in the same industry-size group. We also find that the documented negative association between CEO＇s compensation and performance of board interlock firms are more pronounced in state-owned enterprises, and less pronounced in firms with significant foreign ownership. These evidences indicate that China listed firms use RPE in CEO＇s compensation package, and the peer group in the process of RPE is composed of firms which have board interlocks with the RPE firm. Additionally, the use of RPE is asymmetric in firms with state ownership and foreign ownership. Firms with foreign ownership are more likely to use RPE in CEO＇s compensation, while state-owned firms are less likely to use RPE.

作者李留闯

机构地区西北工业大学管理学院

出处《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期73-83,共11页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基金国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302195 71402141)

关键词董事联结 CEO薪酬相对业绩评价参照公司选择 board interlock CEO ＇ s compensation relative performance evaluation peer group selection

分类号 F271 [经济管理—企业管理]

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