基于演化博弈的大气污染防治主体行为分析

Behavioral Analysis of the Principal Part of Atmospheric Pollution Control——Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

近年来,我国大气污染形势日益严峻,给我国的经济和社会发展造成阻碍。基于演化博弈分析,从大气污染防治主体出发,从中央政府和地方政府,中央政府约束下地方政府之间,地方政府和企业,以及企业和公众四个层面建立演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程分析大气污染防治主体间的策略演进规律及其影响因素。分析表明中央政府和地方政府间博弈只有一个演化稳定策略,即双方都进行环境监管,其余三组演化博弈模型均有两个演化稳定策略,且最终的策略选择受到一系列因素的综合影响。为了实现帕累托最优,促进各主体协同防治大气污染,建议加强技术创新从而降低政府监管成本以及企业治污成本;加大对排污企业的处罚力度;改革地方政府政绩考核体系;引入公众参与。

In recent years, the atmospheric pollution situation is increasingly serious, which has hampered the economic and social development in China. Considering the principal part of atmospheric pollution control, four evolutionary game models are constructed. They are relationships between the central government and local governments, between different local governments, between local governments and corporations and between corporations and the public. The behavioral evolution rules and the factors affecting the evolutionary process are given according to replieator dynamics equations. It is showed that there is only one ESS for the evolutionary game model between the central government and local governments, environmental regulation of both. Other three models have two ESSs, and the ultimate stable strategy is selected by the combined effect of a number of factors. To promote collaborative prevention and strengthening technological innovation so control of atmospheric pollution, we suggest as to reduce the cost of government regulation and of enterprises pollution treatment, increasing penalties for polluters, reforming local government performance evaluation system and introducing public participation.